Since then, Iran has considered itself free of the limits but has eroded them round the edges rather than ditching them completely. Israel’s concerns were subsequently partly assuaged by Donald Trump, who ditched the treaty and strengthened the sanctions regime in 2018. It was disliked from the start by an Israeli government deeply suspicious of Iran. The joint comprehensive plan of action (JCPOA) involved Iran, the US, China, France, Russia, Germany and the UK. For the moment, the possibility of a crisis has lessened but not disappeared.Īfter years of gradual progress while Barack Obama was in the White House, the 15-year agreement was reached in July 2014 which would limit Iran’s nuclear ambitions in return for sanctions relief. There has been subsequent talk of a breakthrough on verification and monitoring activities. If both China and Russia benefit from the likely changes, what of the one other key state within the region, Israel? The long-term response of the Netanyahu government to the new circumstances will depend greatly on the status of the presently defunct Iranian nuclear deal.Ī recent period of tension was eased by quick diplomacy by the head of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, last month. Moscow also maintains close military connections with Iran, a relationship which is currently bearing fruit in the shape of a supply of armed drones for its war in Ukraine. The base is now something of a military transport hub for links to Libya and states further south across the Sahel. Russia has also long had the use of the Syrian Air Force’s Hmeimim airbase and has recently extended one of the runways. The port at Tartus is in the middle of a significant expansion that includes the construction of a new floating dock for ship repair.įriends again? Syrian president Bashar al-Assad with the Egyptian foreign minister, Sameh Shoukry in Damascus, February 2023. It has carefully nurtured its military connections with Syria over the past decade, starting with its small naval facility at Tartus, which has the potential to give Russia a warm-water Mediterranean port. Russia is also likely to benefit, if less directly. Beijing will benefit by taking a key role in facilitating the deal, thereby increasing its status across the Islamic Middle East and north Africa. The early indications are that beneficiaries of the two developments will include China and the individual regional autocracies involved. The move is championed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and along with the Saudi-Iran agreement has the potential to reorder the balance of power in the region. It will also mean getting Syria back into the Arab League, from which it has been suspended since 2012 following its brutal suppression of Arab Spring protesters. This should involve an easing of sanctions and more regional economic integration. The essence of the Times story was that some Arab states want to normalise relations with Damascus – even if this is opposed by the US and its western allies. If this report is accurate, the implications of the two developments for Middle East politics are substantial – not least because of recent social and political developments in Israel and Iran. The previous week, writing in the Times, Middle East correspondent Michael Spencer revealed a plan by Gulf states to restore relations with the Assad regime in Syria. While a long way from bringing an end to conflicts such as the bitter war in Yemen, it is, as Simon Mabon noted in an article for the Conversation, a positive development. On March 10, in a deal brokered by China and signed in Beijing, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations and reopen embassies after a seven-year break. Following political developments in the past fortnight, two state-level policy changes in the Middle East are likely to combine to have a substantial impact on regional stability.
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